



COMMAND-OR MANAGEMENT?

LIKE many of our brothers-in-arms among the military professionals, we felt that something had been said which needed to be said when Hanson W. Baldwin, one of America's most eminent military writers, recently spoke out against the one-voice, one-Service, one-leader philosophy that has been imposed on the American military establishment ("The McNamara Monarchy," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 9, 1963).

Had we been privileged to offer advice to Mr Baldwin while he wrote his brief but searching dissertation, we would have suggested only one change, and that one merely in emphasis, not in content. As one of his many well-taken points, Mr Baldwin deplored the burgeoning emphasis on "management" and managerial technique as opposed to the traditional concept of the military leader's function as one of "command." Its end result, he wrote, might easily be "military yes-men or conformists . . . wizards of the new techniques of operational analyses and computer calculations, but without the moral courage or leadership qualifications required by the battlefield." We would have dwelled longer on the subject than Mr Baldwin because we believe that this trend is being carried to an extreme that dangerously weakens the entire military establishment.

The trend is epitomized, of course, by Secretary of Defense McNamara and his team of computer-oriented civilian managerial specialists. It is manifested most noticeably in the proliferation of cost-effectiveness studies, program reviews, statistical analyses, and analyses of analyses. It has permeated every military level, though, through both pressure and propaganda from the top. By its tenets, military Commanders are encouraged to treat their leadership functions not as Commanders of military formations but as something resembling branch managers for a vast chain of Sears Roebuck stores.

IT isn't the use of modern techniques that we decry, but the almost obsessive fervor which has established them, not just as a complement to but as a substitute for military judgment. Good management of resources is indeed a responsibility and a vital function of military command. Waste, whether it's of money, manpower, materiel, or time, detracts from the ability of a military organization to accomplish its mission. In many ways, though, good management no longer is a mere function of command. The principle has been twisted around until it's now widely understood as "Command is a responsibility and function of good management."

From directive, manual, press release, Service school literature and public statement, this new concept presses in on military leaders at every level. More and more, real decision-making power rests with program reviewers and budget analysts and Comptrollers, able enough men in their fields but woefully ill-equipped to measure the tactical implications of a given course of action. High-ranking Commanders wrestle with automated record-keeping systems, and by-the-numbers maintenance and sup-

ply procedures, and fear the effects of error in these fields on their efficiency ratings more than they once would have feared the wrath of their superiors for a battlefield miscalculation. Lesser Commanders are exhorted to bear-down on record-keeping, facilities management, and full utilization of equipment, and are left with the impression that shortcomings in these peripheral fields are more to be avoided than ineffective leadership of troops.

At Base after Base, and Post after Post, operations have come to resemble an ordinary civilian community, and the members thereof have commenced to regard themselves in the same light. Men no longer think of themselves as "going on duty" or "taking their posts" but as "going to work," like any store manager or factory hand. Talk is heard of "compensatory time off" after a prolonged effort, almost as an inviolable right.

IT wasn't the introduction of modern methods and more efficient techniques that brought this about. It was the undue stress placed on those techniques, and the subtle shift from the philosophy of "command" to that of "management," which gradually distorted the military man's view of his own role.

It's not a mere question of semantics. More than in any other profession, military men must be psychologically conditioned to the sometimes-harsh demands of their job. They must be instilled with belief in themselves, in their comrades, in their leaders, and in the Nation. They must be so infused with the tradition of Duty, Honor, Country, that they will submerge their own desires for personal comfort, personal safety, personal gain, in this great ideal.


The function of a military force is to fight, if need be, and to win. It hardly needs be said that by its obvious ability and willingness to fight and win, a military force also deters war. The primary function of a Commander is to create a military organization that can do just that—fight and win. To do so, he must regard himself as a *Commander*, not as a "manager," and he likewise must be so regarded by the soldiers, sailors and airmen who serve under him.

The very term, "management," implies cold, impersonal efficiency, not devotion to an ideal.

The "Old Man" once was a symbol of all the virtues a military leader should possess. He shared the hardships and dangers with his men. He saw to their needs before his own. He gave them loyalty and received theirs in return. His personal qualities invited their admiration. Today, under the inordinate influence of such techniques as "career management," punch card "programming," and IBM decision-making, he's not around long enough, nor are his men, to permit the growth of a person-to-person bond of mutual respect. He has become a position, not a person.

Good management? Most certainly. It's a vital necessity in this age of complex weapons and machines, but only as a tool of command, not as an all-pervasive goal in itself. ♦

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DEAR GUARDSMEN: It's gratifying to find that there are Guardsmen who are aware of the public relations value of "THE NATIONAL GUARDSMAN" and who, on their own initiative, are making good use of it in one way or another.

For example: SFC Nicholas B. Aleshin of Farmingdale, NY, sent us his personal check with a request that we put "Newsday," at Garden City, and "The Long Island Daily Press" at Jamaica, on our subscription list. What sparked his action was what he described as the "very informative" articles on "realignment" in our March issue, and his wish that copies "could be mailed to newspapers across the Country." It would overload our "Comp" list to do that, but subscriptions spread among well over 4,000 "sponsoring" units would cover every local paper, news magazine, TV and radio station with the Guard's story every month!

For another good example: Wisconsin Rapids, Wis, Guard units have subscribed to 40 copies which CWO Leslie Heath, PR Officer for the 2d How Bn, 120th Arty, mails each month to schools, doctors, dentists, barbers, etc. He introduced the free mailings with a letter asking the recipients to put our magazine where their students, patients or customers will see—and read it.

We're sure these imaginative Guardsmen don't mind imitators! —AGC

OUR COVER: POLARIS . . . SKYBOLT . . . NIKE-HERCULES—these terrifying, sophisticated, almost-animate examples of today's technology are not the cause, but only symbols, of some of the issues involved in the cleavage over US defense policy. In this issue, William V. Kennedy discusses the three-way feud among Defense Dept civilians, seasoned military chiefs, and the Press, over the making of policies which can mean the difference between life and death for the Nation.

