



MG Robert F. Ensslin Jr., President, NGAUS

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

THE GUARD IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

What is there to say about the National Guard's performance in the Persian Gulf War?

The main thing we would say about the Guard's track record is that the Total Force Policy has been vindicated. Guard units performed superbly. So many good things happened in this mobilization that it is difficult to know where to begin. So let's begin with a comment about a decision having nothing directly to do with the Guard, but everything to do with the way this war unfolded. That was the Bush administration's decision, learning from military history of the 1960s, to prosecute this war full-bore from Day 1.

An associated aspect was the early decision to mobilize the Guard and Reserve. This began in August 1990 with President George Bush's decision to invoke, for the first time in history, the authority under section 673(b), title 10, to call 200,000 members of the Guard and Reserve for up to 180 days. We hailed this decision at the time, all the while wondering why Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney excluded Army Guard combat units from the call.

We are able to note with pride the fact that the Guard units called reported to mobilization stations with little difficulty and high morale. Many of us have heard the assertion from our nonfriends that Guard members would never show up for a mobilization. This proved totally untrue, as we knew it would. Indeed, the number of nondeployable members of our units was lower than in some active duty units. The call-up of Army Guard combat support and combat service support units proceeded with few hitches as these units conducted postmobilization training and then deployed to the desert. There, they have performed and are performing admirably by all accounts.

In addition, two field artillery brigades have lent firepower to the de-

ployed Guard's forces. One of the first volleys of fire at the beginning of the land war was by the Oklahoma Army Guard's Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS) battalion, one of the first combat arms units mobilized.

On the final day of the war, before President Bush declared the unilateral cease-fire, the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech) was certified as fully ready. This occurred about 90 days after it reported to mobilization station. We could only observe that if the 48th Brigade and the other two roundout brigades mobilized had been called up on September 1 instead of December 1, they could have been deployed in time to join their parent roundout divisions for combat.

Many in the Guard continue to wonder about the training requirement placed upon these roundout brigades. There is some anecdotal evidence emerging that shows that the active Army divisions deployed early to the Middle East suffered some of the same training shortfalls identified so unfairly in the 48th Brigade. As one division commander in Saudi Arabia noted in February, his division does not have much opportunity in peacetime to maneuver at division level. This was the very point critics made about the Guard's roundout brigades.

It seems fair to observe that had the 48th Brigade been called and deployed based on original roundout plans, it would have had the same opportunities to train itself for the Iraqi challenge under the 24th Division's supervision, as did the division's two active duty brigades. It seems unlikely, given known readiness ratings based on the Army's readiness-rating system, that the 48th Brigade's readiness was significantly different the day of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait than the other elements of the division. However, it is equally obvious that the situation had changed vastly by December 1, when the other parts of the 24th

Division had been in the desert for four months.

Perhaps the biggest single success story for the Guard, as often is the case, is the Air Guard. The Air Force showed its confidence in the Air Guard from the beginning by calling for extensive access to C-5, C-141, C-130 and KC-135 units. The blue-suit philosophy relies much more on volunteerism than does the Army, which must rely much more heavily on unit integrity and cohesiveness. So, our air refueling and transport aircraft responded quickly to the call for volunteer aircrews and aircraft. They performed superbly.

By the end of the year, the Air Force had mobilized two of our F-16 units, the 169th Tactical Fighter Group from South Carolina and the 174th Tactical Fighter Wing from Syracuse, New York, and two RF-4C units from Alabama and Nevada. All participated in the air war from Day 1. A South Carolina pilot was the first to shoot down an Iraqi fighter the first night of the war. Our "recce" units provided all the tactical reconnaissance for the war.

In the wind-down of the Vietnam War, GEN Creighton W. Abrams Sr. spoke for many senior military men of that era when he vowed that the United States would never undertake a war of significant proportions again without calling the Guard and Reserve. He noted that it was only with this commitment from grass roots America, as exemplified by a mobilization that rallies American public opinion, to support can any national administration's war aims be successful.


The mobilization of more than 200,000 members of the Guard and Reserve for this medium-sized war in the Persian Gulf would seem to have vindicated the Abrams doctrine—as well as the Total Force Policy.

National Guard

NATIONAL GUARD

APRIL 1991

Volume XLV, Number 4



COVER:

Members of the 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, train at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, after being mobilized for the Persian Gulf War. Photo by Maj Jean Marie Beall, assistant editor/features. Design, Johnson Design Group.

FEATURES

48th Infantry: Ready and Willing 16

The 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, has been training at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, since last December, after being mobilized for Operation DESERT STORM. It is the roundout brigade for the 24th (Mech) Infantry Division, which was one of the first to be deployed to the Persian Gulf. While at NTC the Guard members learned new techniques for fighting Saddam Hussein's forces in the desert.

Grading the Air Guard's Readiness 22

The Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) is an Air National Guard commander's scorecard when it comes to combat readiness. The ORI is conducted by the inspector general section of the group or wing's gaining command headquarters every three to four years. It is an undisputed measurement of a unit's readiness and effectiveness.

Army Guard Keeps Score with the 1-R 28

The Army National Guard's 1-R evaluates what the commander of a unit has planned to train in during annual training. This may have little to do with the unit's entire wartime mission, so it can be biased. The value of the 1-R depends directly on those active Army members who do the evaluation, whether good or bad.

Expanding Nation Building in Africa 34

With the end of the Cold War and the Middle East crisis, support of economic development in Africa is sure to suffer. But some strategists contend that sub-Saharan Africa is strategically important to the United States because of its location near the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. It is suggested that National Guard nation building missions in Africa would be advantageous to the United States.

Taking the Guard Out of Combat 38

It is being suggested by some that since the Department of Defense seems reluctant to deploy National Guard combat troops, the National Guard should give up its combat role and concentrate on combat support and combat service support roles. This way, National Guard units would be involved in all military contingencies.

April 1991

DEPARTMENTS

President's Message	2
Washington Tie-Line	4
Views From the Field	5
Capital Focus	10
Newsbreaks	12
Leading Edge	42
Enlisted People	44
Posting	46
Publisher's Notebook	50

PUBLICATION STAFF

- MG Bruce Jacobs (ret.)
Publisher
- LTC Reid K. Beveridge
Editor
- CPT Pamela A. Kane
Managing Editor (Deployed)
- Maj Jean Marie Beall
Assistant Editor/Features
- Belinda Reilly
Assistant Editor/Production
- COL W.D. McGlasson (ret.)
Interim Assistant Editor
- COL John C. Philbrick (ret.)
Advertising Sales
- Col David A. McLaughlin (ret.)
Controller

NATIONAL GUARD, April 1991. The NATIONAL GUARD Magazine (ISSN 0163-3945) is published monthly, by the National Guard Association of the United States, with editorial and advertising offices at One Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001. Telephone (202) 789-0031. Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices. Copyright 1990 by the National Guard Association of the U.S. All rights reserved. All members of the NGAUS receive NATIONAL GUARD; \$7 of membership dues are allocated to a magazine subscription. Nonmember subscriptions: \$10 per year. The Editor welcomes original articles bearing on national defense, with emphasis on application to or implications for the National Guard. Postmaster: Send Form 3579 to NATIONAL GUARD, One Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001.

