



MG Charles M. Kiefner, President, NGAUS

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

THE NONMOBILIZATION OF THE GUARD FOR OPERATION JUST CAUSE

We in the Guard are justly proud of the performance of National Guard units during last year's invasion of Panama known as Operation JUST CAUSE. However, during the recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)-NGAUS symposium on the "Future of the Guard and Reserve," one aspect of this service was called into question.

This was the failure—refusal actually—of the services to mobilize any units for Operation JUST CAUSE as contrasted with the call for volunteers from the Guard and Reserve.

Several speakers at our symposium called our attention to this disconnect. Various views were expressed on the merits of this issue as a valid concern. Several speakers hailed the volunteer system and argued that it was sufficient to solve the problem of very-short-notice operations that were not deemed to be of long duration. Others decried the DoD's decision against mobilization.

Again, while praising the many volunteers from our units and from the Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve who raised their hand and deployed to Central America, we must come down modestly on the side of those concerned with the future. And to wonder why the 200,000 mobilization authority contained in Section 673(b) of title 10, US Code, was not utilized in this case. It would have been a perfect time to test this authority and the mobilization mechanism it would have triggered because:

One. Former Panamanian Dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega was among the most despised men in the world. President Bush's decision to intervene in Panama was wildly popular in the United States and even was (behind the scenes) supported by other Latin American national leaders.

Two. The types of units needed would have been in the first wave, hence security should not have been an issue. One reason cited by some Army and Air Force planners is that

when a Guard or Reserve unit is mobilized, that cannot be kept a secret very well. In other words, it is easier to keep a deployment of the 82d Airborne Division from Fort Bragg a secret than an infantry battalion from the 29th Infantry Division of Maryland/Virginia.

Since no combat units from the Guard were envisioned for Operation JUST CAUSE, this Department of the Army staff rationale falls apart. What was requested by GEN Maxwell R. Thurman, who is the commander-in-chief/South, was civil affairs units from the Army Reserve.

Three. One reason for not invoking the 673(b) authority at the time of the Kuwaiti tanker reflagging and the resultant call-up of Navy Reserve minesweepers was that then-President Reagan didn't want to trigger the War Powers Act. In that particular case, this might have some merit (the ships were deployed, the Navy Reserve crews were not called) because the tanker escort in the Persian Gulf was almost certain (as it turned out to be) a much longer duration operation than 90 or 180 days. That clearly was not to be the case in Panama, or was it in Grenada in 1983.

The 673(b) authority was created as a part of the Total Force Policy just for such contingencies as Operation JUST CAUSE. It also was created for much larger contingencies, too, but only as a way of getting early-deploying units on their way in a timely fashion while the requisite national debate about war and peace takes place. That is one reason why the 200K authority is only for 90 days unless extended by the president for a second 90 days. This is a very distinct and meritorious aspect of this law. If a military operation does not have the support of the American people as ratified by the Congress after 90 or 180 days, then Americans should question the validity of continuing that operation.

We believe we are long overdue for a test of this 200K call-up authority. It

was created for a specific purpose. When the United States' national security policy requires a contingency operation, we should be demanding that the 673(b) authority be exercised. We need to make sure that units, not individuals, are used in these operations. The National Guard in particular is composed of units. The reserves are a source of individuals.

While volunteers may be fine, as proved to be the case in Panama, this is hardly the same as deploying units. Even in professional military occupational specialties like civil affairs, we have to question the functional effectiveness of any organization that is ad hoc assembled in the operational area as contrasted with deploying a cohesive, trained unit where the chain of command and the leadership have worked and trained together over a period of months and years.

Finally, if the Total Force Policy means anything, we should insist on 673(b) mobilization the next time we mount a contingency operation. Our future depends on it. We send a very bad signal to DoD planners when units are not used like they are intended to be.

It sometimes is said that national administrations are reluctant to make the political decision to mobilize even a tiny portion of the Guard and Reserve because it sounds too much like we are going to war. However, this has never been the issue in any contingency since the end of the Vietnam War. The fact is no president has ever had the opportunity to make that decision. It has been deflected in every instance by the senior uniformed leaders of the services.

We believe a president who has made the decision to mount an operation like Operation JUST CAUSE would have the political will to mobilize that portion of the Guard and Reserve requested by the theater commander-in-chief. He should be given that opportunity.

National Guard

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Oklahoma Air Guard Makes History 16

The 137th Tactical Airlift Wing, Oklahoma Air National Guard, earned a 99.5 percent on its standardization/evaluation program. It is believed that this is the highest score ever made in the 22d Air Force. The 137th's wartime mission is providing close combat support for US ground troops and their allies.

How to Avoid Unlawful Command Influence 18

It is every citizen's right to a fair trial and due process if accused of illegal actions. Due to the military's command structure, there is the potential for unlawful command influence, which could violate an accused's right to a fair and impartial trial. Learn how to recognize and avoid unlawful influence.

National Guard Takes Environmental Lead 24


Lt Gen John B. Conaway, chief, National Guard Bureau, has listed environmental compliance as one of his top goals for the National Guard. In fact, he has said he wants the National Guard to set the standards for which other agencies are judged. To back this up, the Bureau is expanding its environmental staff and pushing Congress for more money.

Idaho Tops-off RF-4C Pilots 30

The Idaho Air National Guard's 189th Tactical Reconnaissance Training Flight is the only unit—active or reserve—that trains RF-4C pilots and weapons systems officers. This year, the active Air Force shut down its own reconnaissance training unit and now the 189th tops-off active pilots, as well.

Determining the Role of the Guard 34

With the monumental international events, both political and economical, taking place in the past year, the National Guard, as well as all branches of military service, finds itself under intense scrutiny. What is the National Guard's future role in national defense? The author, COL Richard P. Morton, has developed a reorganization that includes all branches of service.



COVER:

The Massachusetts Military Reservation on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, was identified in 1982 by the Department of Defense as having hazardous waste sites. Because of the seriousness of the problem, it is one of only two sites that the National Guard Bureau has on the "superfund" list. Photo, Capt Jean Marie Beall. Design, Johnson Design Group.

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