

MG Robert F. Ensslin Jr., President, NGAUS

# PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

## IT'S A QUESTION OF RESOURCES AND TURF

There are many perplexing questions surrounding the use of the National Guard in the Persian Gulf War. We have expressed a few of them in this space previously, the main one of which is the reluctance, nearly the refusal, of the Department of Defense to call and deploy the National Guard's combat units. None of the Army Guard's infantry or tank battalions reached the Persian Gulf, or did our combat aviation elements.

The main exception to this very public refusal to deploy the heart of the Guard's combat-arms assets was the Air Force's mobilization and deployment of two of the Air Guard's F-16 units. The "Boys from Syracuse" and the South Carolinians, who won GUNSMOKE two years ago, acquitted themselves very well by all accounts. A South Carolina F-16 pilot had the first kill of an Iraqi fighter.

The Air Guard's record reinforces, in part at least, the stark differences between how the services handled this call-up. The Army did not call any combat-arms Guard units at the beginning, having been precluded from doing so by Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney's call-up directive.

An additional part of the equation in the Army's thinking doubtless was need. Many, many combat support and combat service support units were mobilized and deployed, to function in the desert superbly. However, there simply were no such units on active duty, or if there, they were in insufficient quantity to support a desert theater. A few of these units were rated "not combat ready" (C-4 or C-5) when they were called. Nonetheless, they were readied for deployment in short order at mobilization stations and deployed. Deficiencies were either ignored or compensated-for later.

The contrast with the way our three roundout combat brigades were treated is stark. All three were rated combat ready (at least C-3) when the war began August 2. According to one Army Guard source, the three bri-

gades of the 24th Infantry Division (Mech), two active Army and the Georgia Guard's 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech), were rated about equal in combat readiness before the war.

However, when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney finally made the decision to mobilize them in mid-November, suddenly they were not combat ready anymore, and they were declared to be in need of extensive "workup" training, whatever that is. This turned out to be nearly 90 days of arduous maneuvers and gunnery that, although useful in the sense that any and all training is useful, was repetitious of near-term previous training in many instances. For example, one battalion and the 48th's brigade headquarters had rotated through the National Training Center just last summer. They were reported to have done well, given the fact that the NTC does not bestow a "score" or evaluation on such rotations.

The armored battalion from South Carolina was required to redo all its tank gunnery despite the fact that it had done all this gunnery at annual training last summer. What seems clear is that none of these combat units was given credit for much, if any, of its previous training accomplishments. It was as if the slate was wiped clean on M-Day and every aspect of combat readiness had to be re-proved.

Yet another contrast is the experience of our field artillery units. Those combat arms organizations were mobilized and deployed to Saudi Arabia with minimum delay. They all participated in the ground war. Some would argue that the coordination required of a field artillery battalion or brigade equals that required of a similar infantry organization.

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At least two conclusions emerge from this recitation of the facts of recent history. First, DoD mobilized the units it sorely needed for the war. This is a natural reaction, perhaps a

proper management decision. Mobilizing the Guard and Reserve is expensive in both money and disruption of manpower.

The Army needed our combat service support units and our field artillery. It did not need, because it had plenty of them, mechanized infantry and armored brigades and divisions. It could, when it was asked, backfill the two roundout brigades not mobilized from the Guard in August with active Army brigades that were already at hand and available.

A second factor, which is partly a conclusion, is that many of us in the Guard have gained the perception that our combat arms units were put in a position where it was almost impossible to succeed. Because the Army did not need them in Saudi Arabia and because many active Army officers instinctively disbelieve that a Guard maneuver unit (infantry and armor) can be combat ready, they set up a self-fulfilling prophesy.

And finally, we would emphasize the great success the Army and particularly Air Guard units enjoyed that actually did deploy. We strongly believe that had the combat units of the Army Guard deployed with their parent divisions, they would have been a part of the great combat successes, too. The 48th Brigade certainly would have been successful, just as the 24th Division was, because it would have had the same five months of training in Saudi Arabia as the 1st and 2d Brigades of the division.

That is the turf aspect to this. Too many active Army officers cannot believe a Guard infantry brigade can be combat ready and they base their force structure decisions on this assumption. This can, if we allow it to, result in a political decision on resources, which is the bottom line. When the time comes to cut Defense spending after the war is fully over, then how various components did in the war will matter. That is the challenge for the future.

National Guard

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### COVER:

Air Guard members were active throughout DESERT STORM, whether flying air refueling, fighter or reconnaissance missions. Here, members of the New York Air Guard's 174th Tactical Fighter Wing celebrate after one successful mission. Photo, MSgt John Luszc. Design, John Design Group.

## FEATURES

### Civil Disturbances

Historically, the Guard has responded to incidents of civil disturbances, but perhaps its most turbulent times came during the 1950s and 1960s when racial tensions erupted and the antiwar movement exploded.


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### Adjutants General Meet in Washington

Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney addressed the Adjutants General Association of the United States during its midwinter meeting in Washington, DC.

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### Air Guard Covers Skies of DESERT STORM

A Nevada Air Guard reconnaissance pilot reflects on his role in DESERT STORM and lauds the support from fellow Air Guard pilots from Illinois and New York.

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### 105th MAG Saves Children

While on a mission in Saudi Arabia during DESERT STORM, members of the 105th Military Airlift Group, New York Air Guard, saved 60 children during a Scud attack, eventually flying them to safety.

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### Red Bull Division Reactivated

Fifty years after its mobilization for World War II, the famed 34th Infantry Division, known as the Red Bull Division, was reactivated. The Minnesota-based unit has units in Iowa, Illinois and Wisconsin as well.

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