AS WE SEE IT

ONE ARMY

BY MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM H. HARRISON, JR.
President, National Guard Association of the United States

I N mid-October, at the request of Secretary of the Army Brooker, these gathered in one of the conference rooms of the Pentagon as sparkling a collection of Army brass, including members of the reserve components, as has been assembled in the same time. They were present to discuss and to make recommendations for the implementation of the "ONE ARMY" concept.

Actually, we have been "ONE ARMY" from the very outset, and so long as we continue to wear the uniform, have the same missions and objectives, attend the same schools and share the same training facilities in the field, we shall be "ONE ARMY." In his very sincere and pertinent remarks at the opening of the conference, Secretary Brooker told the story of the large and sometimes volatile family that wrapped furiously at times among themselves, but established a determined, beligerent and solidly united front whenever an outsider sought to unjustly criticize a member of the class.

This pernicious beast must be solved before the Secretary's point. Certainly, an objective of the "ONE ARMY" principle is to create for the public and the Congress a "ONE ARMY" image—a true picture of the three components comprising a single, integrated team working to accomplish its peace-time missions by maintaining the highest possible degree of combat-readiness.

There is no intention to shadow the identity of the three separate components that make up the "ONE ARMY." The 24th House of Congress, or even the 19th, does not see the military as a whole.

The concept of the "ONE ARMY," as a being, is to mold the Regular Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve into an organization that thinks and acts as one unit, rather than as separate teams. Thus, I feel, can be accomplished without any of the three components losing identity.

We would be less than realistic to think that there won't be some different, however, and some family squabbling from time to time.

There are many authoritatively written and studied experiences with how there are no components on the battlefield. While there may be some variation in missions in peacetime between the Regular establishment and the re-
serve components, there is only one mission in combat—

to close and defeat the enemy.

What Secretary Brooker seeks, therefore, is to implement, deliberately, in time of peace, when the interests of not only individuals, but of separate components, are major factors, a concept that is workable and effective in times of combat. It is understandable that the Secretary should desire this, and it is difficult to see how the end result could be anything but mutually beneficial.

We might further ask—What does the "ONE ARMY" concept mean to the Army National Guard?

It means, of course, to achieve a better understanding of the Army National Guard, particularly of its dual Federal-State status. Until now, this understanding is widespread in the Army. "ONE ARMY" shall not be effective. This point was made very effectively at the opening session of the Secretary's conference by Major General Milton A. Beckard, Adjutant General of Maryland.

He stated that many of the problems confronting the Army National Guard stem from the failure of the Army General Staff to understand, appreciate and give full objective consideration to the Army National Guard. This is a problem, General Beckard stressed, in our dealings with the staffs of the headquarters of the Continental Armies or other field agencies of the Army. Until there is evidence that the Army Staff has been properly indoctrinated and is prepared to give such objective considerations and study to Army National Guard problems, we in the National Guard cannot have the confidence in this branch of the service which is necessary to the full and proper implementation to the "ONE ARMY" concept.

General Beckard's remarks were probably the most realistic uttered at the two-day meeting. They were in line with Secretary Brooker's own feelings in this regard. He had already said that there is "urgent necessity to increase confidence and mutual trust among all of the components and branches of the Army."

There are mechanisms involved in converting a philosophy or a concept into an acceptable working reality. The first step in doing this, and one of the most important, is to obtain some 20 recommendations approved by the delegates to the "ONE ARMY" conference were assigned to appropriate staff sections for comment or action. As these recommendations are considered, any and every Army, every armory, required to keep the Army National Guard at the highest level of mobilization readiness.

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The moral of the story: being don't quit sending us accounts of outstanding activities (interesting enough to attract attention in other units than your own) just because we failed to use them right away. They may have suffered the fate of many another good story—reached us when we had more material than we could cram-in.

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Our OVER: Lt Col Lachlan M Field, Active Army Advisor to the 43 1st DiArmy, captures some of the massive power of the 43 1st DiArmy and hints at the feeling which Artillerymen have for the mighty weapons they serve in these decisions, while the New Englanders were in field training. He shows the line man at his never-ending job of stringing wire, the Section Leader with his "Ready to fire" signal, and the gun crew as it prepares for the order "Fire!"