MORE STRENGTH—NOT LESS—FOR GREATER READINESS

This statement of Policy with respect to proposals purportedly aimed at providing greater readiness in the Army's Reserve Forces was adopted by the Adjutant General Association of the United States at its annual conference in New York City, 3 May 1962. A copy was sent to President Kennedy. It stands, as our Editorial for this month, as a reasoned and comprehensive basis upon which to build really ready Army National Guard forces.—The Editors

THE Adjutants General Association of the United States, recognizing the military threat to the peace and security of the United States and other Countries of the Free World, commends the President of the United States for determined, courageous and positive actions undertaken during the past year to strengthen the Nation's defenses. We fully support his statement that our Country should have a choice other than holocaust or surrender. Such threats to freedom will continue so long as aggressive nations maintain massive conventional forces and nuclear attack capabilities. It is increasingly clear, therefore, that the military basis of the Active and Reserve forces of the United States must be strengthened, for freedom in this period of intense international tension can be secured only by the maintenance of nuclear and conventional defense forces superior to those of any possible aggressor.

The Active Military forces of the United States require the backup and support of effective Reserve Forces in partial mobilizations, such as we are now experiencing, or in general mobilization. Special emphasis of the President's desire to raise the level of mobilization-readiness of National Guard and other Reserve Forces, and especially to develop a force of nearly every National Guard Division and supporting Army National Guard and US Army Reserve non-divisional units, the early-ready Divisions and supporting units to be placed in high priority states.

The attainment of the highest possible levels of combat-readiness in order that Reserve Forces might be deployed for combat or overseas training in the shortest time possible following mobilization is necessary. The Divisions and non-divisional units of the Army National Guard are currently at the highest level of mobilization-readiness ever attained. This high degree of readiness can be extended to other forces, with the authorization of higher mobilization levels, increased issues of weapons and equipment and allocation of more training time for staff and other personnel. 

THERE exists now in the Army National Guard a priority force of eight Divisions.

The National Guard is prepared to provide the Army the types of organization required for balanced Army forces upon mobilization.

To carry out the President's proposal to raise the readiness of Reserve Forces, the Department of Defense proposed that the strength of the Army's Reserve Components be substantially reduced, that more than 800 Company-size units be eliminated (approximately 500 Army National Guard) and four Army National Guard and four US Army Reserve Divisions be declassified.

The Defense Department plan failed to gain approval of the Army General Staff Committee on National Guard and Reserve Policy and the Reserve Forces Policy Board of the Chief of Staff, which these forces charged in law with responsibility for advising the Secretary of the Army and Secretary of Defense on National Guard and Reserve Affairs.

THE Defense Department plan if implemented would severely limit the capability of the Army National Guard to fulfill its Federal and State missions as the Nation's first line Reserve Force. The plan is deficient for these reasons:

(a) It is in fact a reduction of our conventional forces, thereby placing increased reliance on nuclear weapons. This contradicts the need, so sadly lacking, for a flexible response to varying levels of aggression.

(b) It reduces the capability of the States to carry out vital recovery missions in the event of a thermonuclear attack. This is the time when the National Guard is needed most.

(c) It limits the opportunities for the youth of our Country to participate voluntarily in part-time military training.

(d) Decreases the strength of non-priority Force Units to levels below those at which effective training can be conducted, requiring an excess number of "fillers" upon mobilization and greater post-mobilization training time.

(e) Establishes strengths of Priority Force Units at unrealistic levels (50-60%), requiring Commanders thereof to devote a greater portion of their time to recruiting and administration and correspondingly less time to training; and even then the liability and hazard for repeated recall to active service on a relatively small number of men, organizations and communities designated as the Priority Force and precludes rotation of Priority Force designation among available units.

THIS Association, being responsive to the President's desire to have the most effective Reserve Forces possible, submits that the desired high priority Reserve Force for the Army can be best achieved by certain actions to develop that force largely within the existing units, without reducing the number or effectiveness of non-priority units now in being.

We strongly recommend and respectfully urge that these specific actions be taken:

1. Raise the strength level of the Army National Guard to 420,000 to provide the required additional strength for high priority units.
2. Permit the rotation of required high priority units based on capabilities.
3. The existing 27 Divisions and other non-divisional units of the Army National Guard be retained and the necessary realignment of non-divisional units be accomplished by conversion of these existing units to types necessary to meet the Army's mobilization requirements.
4. Additional mobilization and training for the headquarters and staffs of high priority organizations be provided by restoring such staff training time as has been deleted in recent years.
5. Any reorganization or realignment be accomplished as a parallel effort with the reorganization of the Army and Reserve Components in accordance with the ROAC concept.

DEAR GUARDSMEN: In recent years there has been an almost continuous flow of books on National defense, covering nearly every phase of the subject from economics to guerrilla warfare. At long last has come a sound, timely and intelligent book on Reserve Forces—"Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy," by George Fielding Eells. Unlike so many who comment and write these days on National defense, (a high percentage of them theorists, many with an actual military experience), Eells has devoted a lifetime to writing on military affairs. He served before and during World War I in the Australian Army. He did duty, following that war, with the Missouri National Guard and later as a Major in Intelligence units of the US Army Reserve. From 1930 to 1947, he was the military correspondent for the New York "Herald Tribune." He has been a commentator on military affairs for both the Columbia and Mutual Broadcasting Systems. His weekly columns are now syndicated by General Features Corporation. Recently Eells was awarded the University of Missouri Medal for Distinguished Journalism, the first time the award went to a military writer.

We can recommend that every National Guard read "Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy." It is devoted largely to discussions of the Army's Reserve Forces and makes it most clear that the real strength and readiness of these forces is in the Army National Guard. Eells is critical of the Defense Department plan proposed by the Secretary of the Guard for Four Divisions and a large number of non-divisional units.