O NCE AGAIN our National Guard, which has never failed our Nation in repulsing enemies from abroad, is faced with a fight for its very existence.

This is not a struggle for survival against the forces of alien aggression. The National Guard could handle such a battle by itself. Now this mortal threat which is leveled at the Guard, and all it stands for, exists, unfortunately, within our own Government.

I regret that it is necessary for me to remind this House that once again the Army General Staff has embarked on a power grab that, if not stopped, and stopped soon, will destroy the National Guard and render ineffective the civilian control of the military that is a keystone of our form of government.

I am aware that Congress, and particularly this House, has frequently in the past rebuked the Army General Staff's grab for power.

The Nation, and the National Guard, are deeply indebted to Congress for the resolute manner in which it has rebuffed the plans of the Army General Staff. Ever since the Army General Staff came into being, it has waged a vicious vendetta against what the National Guard stands for.

Why? Simply because the Guard, with its decentralized control, its broad base of citizen participation, and its belief in civilian control of the military, has been an immeasurable obstacle to the Army General Staff plans for imposing the Prussian military system and organization over our Nation.

I need not remind this House that such a supreme general staff has been the goal of the Army General Staff. I am sure that we all believed that Congress had once and for all settled the matter in 1946 and 1949 by vigorously rejecting the Army General Staff demands for a supreme general staff. This Congress did in the most pointed and unquestionable terms by rejecting the Army General Staff's Collins plan—which would have planted such a system in America. In addition, Congress also wrote into the National Security Act the most emphatic prohibitions against a supreme general staff.

We thought that defeated the proponents of this plan and in so doing we had created a permanent protection for our National Guard.

Such preptions against a supreme general staff were imperative if the National Guard were to survive. The moment a supreme staff is created in this country, the National Guard will start to die. As history has proved, National Guard types of military forces cannot survive the Prussian type of highly centralised militarism under a supreme general staff.

Every since prior to World War I the National Guard has been both an obstacle to, and a target of, the Army General Staff. It is no secret that the Army General Staff has starved, squashed, and impeded our National Guard. But because the Guard stands in the way, the Army General Staff has persevered and survived in spite of the Army General Staff.

Is there any wonder, then, why Congress and our National Guard have both opposed every attempt to induce acceptance of the single Chief of Staff-supreme general staff system in the United States?

In a sense Congress and the National Guard are both vitally interested parties. The Prussian system would mean the end of the National Guard and it would also sound the doom of civilian control over the military.

The documentary evidence is conclusive. The master plan for creation of a supreme general staff has been drawn by the Army General Staff. The moment it goes into effect our democratic institutions go into decline.

The greatest citizen army in the world's history, our National Guard, at this very moment has a knife poised against its throat.

There is no secret about the Army General Staff blueprint. It was published with all basic points in the New York Times of June 3–4, 1946.

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This is what the Army General Staff's master plan would do:

First. Convert the Department of Defense into a supreme general staff.

Second. Put a super single Chief of Staff in command of the great supreme general staff and all the Armed Forces.

Third. Eliminate the civilian deputy and Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

Fourth. Replace them with military officers.

(These changes are page 16)