The National Guard Bureau estimates that during Fiscal Year 1972
the enlistments of 89,000 Army National Guard members and
14,000 Air National Guard members will expire. Some of these we can
expect will extend their enlistments almost automatically. By far the
greater proportion of the total are not likely to re-enlist unless they
are offered certain incentives to do so.

The Adjutants General and Commanders of Army and Air National
Guard units all the way down the line will be faced with a challenge of
convincing enough men on-board to extend, or enlisting sufficient
prior- and non-prior-service men to maintain authorized strengths.

In a period in which it is anticipated that Draft calls will be falling,
Active Forces strengths being further reduced and Volunteer Force
goals vigorously pursued, the task will not be easy. If we are to main-
tain authorized strengths in a near-zero or zero-Draft environment, it
will be necessary that the States conduct vigorous retention and re-
cruiting campaigns to achieve authorized strength levels. Certain
incentives, now available or about to be made available for the Active
Services, should be authorized for the National Guard and other Re-
serve Forces. Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&R) Roger T.
Kelley, testifying before both the Senate and House Armed Services
Committees, stated that the Department of Defense has under con-
sideration such retention and recruiting incentives as enlistment/re-
enlistment bonus, survivor benefits, early reserve retirement,
broader medical/dental and death benefits and other items. How-
ever, there are strong indications that the emphasis through Fiscal
Year 1972 will be on support for the Active Forces, and it is not
planned that these incentives shall become available for the National
Guard and Reserves at this time.

The NGATUS has urged Secretary Kelley to transmit at least what
we expect would be the most effective of these incentives—re-enlist-
ment bonus—to the Congress as a legislative proposal.

It has been pointed out to Secretary Kelley that if no incentives were
to become available for the National Guard and Reserves at the start
of Fiscal Year 1972, we stand to lose the far greater portion of those
whose enlistments will expire. Thus, we would be compelled to recruit
substantial numbers of new members, most of whom would require
active duty basic and advanced individual training.

The loss of trained manpower reduces mobilization readiness. The
cost of active duty basic and advanced individual training would exceed
the cost of re-enlistment bonus.

It would make sense, therefore, from both readiness and cost view-
points, to authorize payment of a bonus commencing at the earliest
possible time. To delay action on this incentive for another year or
more would lead, in our judgment, to declines in National Guard and
Reserve strengths with resultant loss in readiness. We view this as
unacceptable in light of Secretary Laird’s increased reliance on these
forces as strength of Active Forces is attritted.

This Association, therefore, strongly recommends as a wise course of
action the authorization of an incentive program for the National
Guard and Reserve in this session of the Congress.*