The House of Representatives seems to have concluded that DoD's Total Force plans for 1995 and beyond are just "less of the same." Nonetheless, the secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have presented, and are insisting upon, their base force strategy and crisis response and reconstitution theories as the new post-Cold War national security policy. Their presentations before Congress and to the media have failed to address major public policy issues and have only partially addressed operational and resource aspects of the strategy.

While the strategy is proposed to provide for a national defense capability that:

- Would fundamentally alter the current balance between the legislative and executive branches in terms of how the nation enters into future armed conflicts.
- Would eliminate the constitutional prescription for the type of balance of military forces.
- Fails to recognize the need for a combat-ready and agile, nonmilitary, reorganization in national defense.
- Does not identify the levels of brinkmanship or escalation available to the president.
- Reduces the American taxpayer's tangible return on their national defense investment.
- Does not take the real constraints of time, distance, transportation and the absence of a specific combat threat.
- Does not provide the most cost-effective defense available.

Critics and proponents of base force strategy agree that a strong national defense is essential to American interests. They differ substantially on how best to provide that defense in the constrained economy of the American Way of Warfare. The critics share the Constitution's vision of defense. The proponents of base force have focused on the operational de

**U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY—WHAT IT WON'T WORK**

**First of Two**

FAILS OF MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY IDENTIFIABLE THREAT TO THE PROTECTION OF THIS COUNTRY AND ITS INTERESTS. THE SECOND OF TWOARTICLES FROM THE JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY. THE FIRST IS THE NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE NEW ERA OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.

"The base force strategy would significantly reduce the National Guard forces available to the states in emergencies and the war on drugs." Critics maintain that a contingency within a constitutional construct is more appropriately defined as a Grenada or Panama-like operation, not an operation requiring 50,000 active members of the armed forces and lasting six months or more, as DESERT STORM did from beginning to end (with a cadre of troops still in Saudi Arabia nearly two years later).

The third major difference of opinion focuses on the peacetime role of the military. Proponents of base force maintain that the social utility of the National Guard in its role as a state force in peacetime is a natural resource—a peace-time benefit which will return on the taxpayers' investment in national defense. And, as with the countryside—America's diversity expresses the population to the military and the military in ways that are gender public understanding and support for national defense. In addition, it educates, through firsthand exposure, all levels of the nation's elected leadership who may never have served a day in uniform.

The final disagreement between base force proponents and critics is about the cost of the base force. Critics claim that the base force is counterproductive to the goal of the new strategy. They argue that the base force, as proposed, is the best realizable money that can be spent.

Critics retort that more forces are needed. They also claim that the base force is not consistent with the new strategy. The critics argue that the base force is structured at far less cost if the Congress continues to "raise armies according to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution as written by the Founding fathers. They provided a prescription for the small possible standing army—perhaps the contingency plan in a forward-deployed force—and it is the citizen military constituting to combat support and combat service support forces and the major combat forces required after the first 30 days of buildup or conflict.

Modification of the base force strategy would remedy many of the failings noted above and at the same time maintain a national defense capable of meeting the needs of the changing geopolitical and security environment in the post-Cold War world.

The Congress and American public are presented with the options of a high-cost, active duty military strategy; a highly affordable, highly mobile strategy; or a national defense capability that is versatile in purpose and use. The National Guard has been an integral part of the American military for nearly 200 years.

**General's Discuss Dual Role**

WASHINGTON—Deputy Director of the Estates, Maj Gen L. R. France, the adjutant general of Arkansas, Maj Gen W. E. Carter, the adjutant general of Colorado, Maj Gen W. B. Brad, the adjutant general of Georgia, and Maj Gen Richard A. Smith, the adjutant general of Delaware, discus the social impact of the National Guard has on the community, state and at the national level.

**Draw Down the Total Army**

WASHINGTON—The Army has completed the draw-down of the Total Army to meet congressionally mandated reductions ordered by FY95, the Department of the Army will remove RIFs, early retirements, reduced accessions and involvements in operations. In addition, the Army will restructure by year group on the branch.

**NATIONAL GUARD CONDUCTS MIDWINTER MEETING**

WASHINGTON—The National Guard of the United States met in Washington, DC January 11th for its midwinter meeting. Much of the session was spent listing to speakers discuss the strategic role of the National Guard. There was a very successful presentation by Maj Gen W. E. Carter, the adjutant general of Colorado. Maj Gen L. R. France, the adjutant general of Arkansas, Maj Gen W. B. Brad, the adjutant general of Georgia, and Maj Gen Richard A. Smith, the adjutant general of Delaware, discus the social impact of the National Guard has on the community, state and at the national level.

**The Rise And Fall Of The Air Force Budget**

The rise and fall of the Air Force's budget follows a similar pattern to its own budget. The Air Force is one of the best-managed and most efficient of the services. It is also one of the most expensive. In the future, the Air Force must balance more emphasis on their national defense investment.