The Key Word Is Work!

There is little doubt in the minds of National Guard leaders that a serious strength crisis in taking shape rapidly. There appears to be some doubt, however, that the seriousness of the situation is fully recognized by commanders at Company and Battalion level, where the actual work of persuading men to sign enlistment, or extension, forms must be done.

Army Guard strength had dropped to 387,795 by 31 October—down 14,377 since the beginning of the Fiscal Year. It was 27,714 men below the peak strength it is authorized to have—412,509. The picture in the Air Guard was less gloomy. The ANG was about 2,000 men below programmed strength on 30 September but managed to reverse the trend and gain back more than 500 during October.

There was encouragement in early reports of some success in signing-up men coming off active duty by Army Guard NCOs assigned to two Active Army training installations in an “in-service” recruiting program.

Strength is an element of readiness, and the Guard can not tolerate a decline in readiness at a time when its units are assuming some critically-important missions previously assigned to Active units in war and contingency plans. With Active Army strength undergoing drastic reduction, the Pentagon has put more of its chips on the Guard, and we must deliver the promised levels of strength and readiness or endanger the Nation’s security.

It is easy to find reasons for the slow but persistent strength decline. But our problem also is a manifestation of our own long reliance on the Draft as a motivation to Guard enlistment, and of tardiness in recognizing that the days of waiting lists and a seller’s market are gone.

From this point forward, success in maintaining strength will go to those who use massive amounts of imagination, salesmanship, and plain hard work to persuade qualified, motivated men to join, and stay in, the National Guard.

MG Francis S. Greenleaf, NGB Chief, recently told a group of State recruiting officers that Company/Battery Commanders do not yet feel great concern because their particular unit is only three or four men under-strength. It’s when you multiply that by the ARNG’s 3,000 units that you grasp the scope of the shortages.

Higher pay, enlistment/re-enlistment bonuses, survivor benefits, improved retirement—all these are necessary if we are to maintain the desired strength levels on a sustained basis. These new material benefits in all probability will be provided sometime next year, but we can’t wait until next year to overcome our strength deficiencies.

It would be a mistake, anyway, to place too much reliance on money and benefits as a sure cure. Energetic recruiting and retention programs, intelligently managed, are the first and most important ingredients of any long-range manpower program. Re-focusing our thoughts toward making Guard service more rewarding, more productive, more responsive to the aspirations of individual Guardsmen is still another.

The key words are plan and work.