Total Force key to success — walk the full mile

TOTAL Force was an eminently sensible idea. It was a concept that was long overdue. It offered a way to maintain the sizable military forces required for our security at a bearable cost.

We would elevate the readiness of Guard and Reserve forces, and thus make it possible to reduce the more costly Active forces. But as the Association of the United States Army has thoughtfully pointed out, "no one has ever claimed that the Total Force idea could be made to work on 'the cheap'," and trying to make it work "on the cheap" is precisely what has occurred.

Four Administrations have lived under the illusion that "wishing would make it so" — that effective, combat-ready military forces can be created without giving them adequate resources. Congress, too, has been unwilling to walk the full mile.

When President Nixon ended the draft, he based his action on assurance that the Active forces, augmented by withdrawing some of the scarce equipment from both Active and Guard/Reserve units with which to "improve the effectiveness of our forward defense" in Europe. Equipment taken from CONUS units will be used to rebuild and expand the garrisoned unit sets of equipment in Europe that were twice depleted, once by the Vietnam War, again by the 1973 Mid-East War.

It's difficult to argue with the need to give the highest priority to NATO defense needs. The Soviet Warsaw Pact axis poses a threat that we must take seriously. They have been steadily increasing their military power, both conventional and nuclear, while we have pursued what Chairman Melvin Price of the House Armed Services Committee calls "unilateral restraint." As the power gap between the two sides widens, the danger of open conflict increases.

As General Rogers explained, the Army has "no alternative but to withdraw some equipment from both Active and Reserve Component units, and divert some existing production output previously allocated to CONUS units." In addition, personnel will be diverted from CONUS to units in Western Europe to assure full-strength units.

Does your insurance retire when you do?

Maj Gen Richard A. Miller (Oregon Army Guard), President National Guard Association of the United States

Said the general: "In short, to increase the force readiness of the early-committed units, we must sacrifice a bit of the unit readiness of units here in CONUS."

Neither the Army nor its highly-respected Chief of Staff can be faulted on the decision. It undoubtedly was essential in the national interest. But we would not have reached this sorry pass, of continually borrowing from Peter to pay Paul, had the Department of Defense programmed for, and the Congress funded for, enough equipment to fill essential requirements. Their failure to do so had a political and economic, rather than a military, basis.

The President and his defense managers, and the Congress, must decide whether they want a viable Total Force or not. If the Total Force idea makes as much sense to them as it does to us, then they must accept the idea that you can't transform nothing into something. Full-time military forces can't produce top readiness without the necessary resources. Neither can part-time Guard/Reserve forces.