The United States is readying itself for the 21st century. The National Guard and its national leaders are preparing for the coming year as well. In their preparation for our nation's defense, they are focusing on the new national defense strategy, the 103rd Congress, the new administration and the new leadership in the Pentagon should continue their support of the National Guard and the citizen-soldier as the bulwark of our national defense. I truly believe we can be optimistic in 1993 about that continued support, so long as we are vigilant in the preservation of the National Guard's long-standing constitutional dual role.

The key to optimism is based on several factors. First, the Congress has largely supported our position on Air Guard force structure. Through your strong grass roots efforts, the Army National Guard is pegged for 422,725 end-strength and force structure. Additionally, the Air National Guard is the only component of the Total Force that will see growth in the coming fiscal year.

With a new administration in town, the NGUSA leadership believes that many of the DoD initiatives that would radically downsize the Army Guard can be modified. President Bill Clinton pledged, during his speech to the 114th NGUSA General Conference in Salt Lake City, that he would make greater use of the Guard and Reserve.

As your Association president, I charge you to spread the word that all is not well in Washington, D.C. . . .

These comments about the fact that we should be optimistic are an ideal lead-in to some discussion of the combat reform initiatives contained in the FY93 Defense Authorization Act. Without a doubt, the membership is concerned about the intent and scope of the bill. At this point, I believe we can even look upon the initiatives with optimism.

First, it should be understood by one and all, the intent of the initiatives is to bring the active Army and the Army National Guard closer together. It was no surprise to us that the recent Rand Force Mix Study reported that there were 12 components that are a chasm between these two components. And because of this chasm, particularly after the Persian Gulf War, our critics called for a diminished combat arms role in the Army Guard. The previous leadership in the Pentagon used the nondeployment of the roundabout and primed the pump. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) leadership wrote initiatives to ensure the Army Guard would continue with a predominant combat arms role in the Total Force. And in the process, the National Guard was kept in the loop. At the outset of developing the FY93 Defense Authorization Act, the HASC staff members approached the NGUSA leadership and staff for our comments and suggestions. As always, we were courteous and outlined our positions. Our positions were not met with the expected comments. The HASC staff members listened and weighed our concerns, and others, in formulating the language.

As your president, I would like to explain three points of the initiatives that have caused the greatest concern among our membership:

One. The requirement that 65 percent of the officers in the Army Guard and 50 percent of the enlisted personnel must have two years active duty is a requirement for the Department of the Army to fulfill. There is little state or unit commander can do to influence these numbers. If the Army is to comply with this initiative by the deadline in 1997, it must involuntary discharge by the 20th century, that he would make greater use of the Guard and Reserve.

As your Association president, I charge you to spread the word that all is not well in Washington, D.C. . . .

These comments about the fact that we should be optimistic are an ideal lead-in to some discussion of the combat reform initiatives contained in the FY93 Defense Authorization Act. Without a doubt, the membership is concerned about the intent and scope of the bill. At this point, I believe we can even look upon the initiatives with optimism.

First, it should be understood by one and all, the intent of the initiatives is to bring the active Army and the Army National Guard closer together. It was no surprise to us that the recent Rand Force Mix Study reported that there were 12 components that are a chasm between these two components. And because of this chasm, particularly after the Persian Gulf War, our critics called for a diminished combat arms role in the Army Guard. The previous leadership in the Pentagon used the nondeployment of the roundabout and primed the pump. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) leadership wrote initiatives to ensure the Army Guard would continue with a predominant combat arms role in the Total Force. And in the process, the National Guard was kept in the loop. At the outset of developing the FY93 Defense Authorization Act, the HASC staff members approached the NGUSA leadership and staff for our comments and suggestions. As always, we were courteous and outlined our positions. Our positions were not met with the expected comments. The HASC staff members listened and weighed our concerns, and others, in formulating the language.

As your president, I would like to explain three points of the initiatives that have caused the greatest concern among our membership:

One. The requirement that 65 percent of the officers in the Army Guard and 50 percent of the enlisted personnel must have two years active duty is a requirement for the Department of the Army to fulfill. There is little state or unit commander can do to influence these numbers. If the Army is to comply with this initiative by the deadline in 1997, it must involuntary discharge by the 20th century, that he would make greater use of the Guard and Reserve.

As your Association president, I charge you to spread the word that all is not well in Washington, D.C. . . .

These comments about the fact that we should be optimistic are an ideal lead-in to some discussion of the combat reform initiatives contained in the FY93 Defense Authorization Act. Without a doubt, the membership is concerned about the intent and scope of the bill. At this point, I believe we can even look upon the initiatives with optimism.

First, it should be understood by one and all, the intent of the initiatives is to bring the active Army and theArmy National Guard closer together. It was no surprise to us that the recent Rand Force Mix Study reported that there were 12 components that are a chasm between these two components. And because of this chasm, particularly after the Persian Gulf War, our critics called for a diminished combat arms role in the Army Guard. The previous leadership in the Pentagon used the nondeployment of the roundabout and primed the pump. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) leadership wrote initiatives to ensure the Army Guard would continue with a predominant combat arms role in the Total Force. And in the process, the National Guard was kept in the loop. At the outset of developing the FY93 Defense Authorization Act, the HASC staff members approached the NGUSA leadership and staff for our comments and suggestions. As always, we were courteous and outlined our positions. Our positions were not met with the expected comments. The HASC staff members listened and weighed our concerns, and others, in formulating the language.

As your president, I would like to explain three points of the initiatives that have caused the greatest concern among our membership:

One. The requirement that 65 percent of the officers in the Army Guard and 50 percent of the enlisted personnel must have two years active duty is a requirement for the Department of the Army to fulfill. There is little state or unit commander can do to influence these numbers. If the Army is to comply with this initiative by the deadline in 1997, it must involuntary discharge by the 20th century, that he would make greater use of the Guard and Reserve.

As your Association president, I charge you to spread the word that all is not well in Washington, D.C. . . .

These comments about the fact that we should be optimistic are an ideal lead-in to some discussion of the combat reform initiatives contained in the FY93 Defense Authorization Act. Without a doubt, the membership is concerned about the intent and scope of the bill. At this point, I believe we can even look upon the initiatives with optimism.

First, it should be understood by one and all, the intent of the initiatives is to bring the active Army and the Army National Guard closer together. It was no surprise to us that the recent Rand Force Mix Study reported that there were 12 components that are a chasm between these two components. And because of this chasm, particularly after the Persian Gulf War, our critics called for a diminished combat arms role in the Army Guard. The previous leadership in the Pentagon used the nondeployment of the roundabout and primed the pump. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) leadership wrote initiatives to ensure the Army Guard would continue with a predominant combat arms role in the Total Force. And in the process, the National Guard was kept in the loop. At the outset of developing the FY93 Defense Authorization Act, the HASC staff members approached the NGUSA leadership and staff for our comments and suggestions. As always, we were courteous and outlined our positions. Our positions were not met with the expected comments. The HASC staff members listened and weighed our concerns, and others, in formulating the language.

As your president, I would like to explain three points of the initiatives that have caused the greatest concern among our membership:

One. The requirement that 65 percent of the officers in the Army Guard and 50 percent of the enlisted personnel must have two years active duty is a requirement for the Department of the Army to fulfill. There is little state or unit commander can do to influence these numbers. If the Army is to comply with this initiative by the deadline in 1997, it must involuntary discharge by the 20th century, that he would make greater use of the Guard and Reserve.

As your Association president, I charge you to spread the word that all is not well in Washington, D.C. . . .

These comments about the fact that we should be optimistic are an ideal lead-in to some discussion of the combat reform initiatives contained in the FY93 Defense Authorization Act. Without a doubt, the membership is concerned about the intent and scope of the bill. At this point, I believe we can even look upon the initiatives with optimism.

First, it should be understood by one and all, the intent of the initiatives is to bring the active Army and the Army National Guard closer together. It was no surprise to us that the recent Rand Force Mix Study reported that there were 12 components that are a chasm between these two components. And because of this chasm, particularly after the Persian Gulf War, our critics called for a diminished combat arms role in the Army Guard. The previous leadership in the Pentagon used the nondeployment of the roundabout and primed the pump. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) leadership wrote initiatives to ensure the Army Guard would continue with a predominant combat arms role in the Total Force. And in the process, the National Guard was kept in the loop. At the outset of developing the FY93 Defense Authorization Act, the HASC staff members approached the NGUSA leadership and staff for our comments and suggestions. As always, we were courteous and outlined our positions. Our positions were not met with the expected comments. The HASC staff members listened and weighed our concerns, and others, in formulating the language.

As your president, I would like to explain three points of the initiatives that have caused the greatest concern among our membership:

One. The requirement that 65 percent of the officers in the Army Guard and 50 percent of the enlisted personnel must have two years active duty is a requirement for the Department of the Army to fulfill. There is little state or unit commander can do to influence these numbers. If the Army is to comply with this initiative by the deadline in 1997, it must involuntary discharge by the 20th century, that he would make greater use of the Guard and Reserve.

As your Association president, I charge you to spread the word that all is not well in Washington, D.C. . . .