MANNING, MODERNIZATION AND MOBILIZATION

N ow the NGAUS 102d General Con-
ference is history, adjourned sine
die as has been proclaimed by pro-
siding officers, we would guess since
time immemorial. A slate of new of-
ficers has been installed to provide for
continuity in leadership and new Exec-
utive Council members have been added
from Areas I and IV.

With the conference behind us only
briefly, it is still difficult to see the
forest for the trees. All of the details
will be captured in the next issue of
National Guard. It is our intent to com-
ment at this time on just one aspect of
the Las Vegas conference—the 1980 theme of “Manning, Modernization and
Mobilization.”

As a consequence of the staff analy-
sis of the main ingredients of the con-
ference theme, a 1980 NGAUS position
paper was written, submitted and
adopted by the conference. The paper
is softly titled: “Manning, Modernization
and Mobilization: After Ten Years of
the Total Force.”

The paper reviews the circumstances
surrounding the public announcement
in September 1970 of the then new “Total Force Guard” and it explores the
events of the 10 intervening years.

It concludes that the concept espoused originally by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird did, in fact, lead to extraordinary changes in the rela-
tionship between the active forces and
the Guard and Reserve. It notes: “This is not to say that Laird’s objec-
tives with respect to funding support
was ever provided to the extent needed.
But it put the relationships into a new—and important—focus.”

It does not, in our view, take a mil-
tary genius to know what it is going
to take to make the new Total Force
Policy achieve all that has been set out
for it. However, it may indeed take
some rare genius to get it done.

Get what done? The NGAUS position paper makes
these specific points:

• Enough equipment to train and to
  fight with. “Come as you are”
  made for a rifles, but it won’t
  wash. Not unless “as you are”
  means that same kind of equip-
  ment which is being used by the
  active forces.

• Support for incentives and en-
litened personnel policies to
  enable the Guard and the active
  forces to maintain needed strength.

This involves realization that the
Guard in peacetime must be man-
aged as a wartime force.

• Step up mobilization-related train-
  ing activities at all levels as a
  reminder that, in the long run, the
  ability to mobilize is the name of
  the game.

The position paper also draws a
series of rather powerful analogies be-
tween the situation which confronts us
today and the situation 40 years ago
when the nation was setting out to put
deployment in order after many years of neglect. It was in 1940 that
the active forces were significantly
enlarged; a major activation program
was launched, the mobilization of the Na-
tional Guard got underway and the first
peacetime draft in the nation’s history
was launched.

Once again, as in 1940, U.S. national
interests are threatened. Alarming
figures have been published as to the
to the extent of the increases in Soviet
defense expenditures and, in addition,
we have seen still another example of
reckless Russian adventurism in the in-
vasion of Afghanistan. On this blatant
occasion, the Soviets did not even seek
to utilize surrogate forces to mask their
aggressive intent. Unofficial sources
continue to report on the field training
activities of the Soviet combat brigade
in Cuba, less than 100 miles from our
shores.

The conclusion which is reached in
the NGAUS position paper is that the
Total Force Policy could produce a win-
ning U.S. strategy. It could produce the
kind of results we have been unable to
attain at other critical moments in U.S.
history. But we are forced to use “con-
ditional” language because there are
serious definitional shortcomings in the
system as we know it today.

Express these shortcomings in terms of the “3 Ms” the situation might be
summarized as follows:

• Modernization is so important that defense strategists are sometimes
  prone to forget shortfalls in other areas. It is essential that some reasonable
data be provided to the Guard and Reserve, across-the-board, personnel and
  individual training policies must be shaped for the purpose of making it easier,
  rather than difficult, for young people to be able to serve.

• Modernization is critical. Sub-
  standard equipment which is “good
  enough to train with” may not be
  good enough for deployment. Since
  Guard units figure in early deployment plans,
  Army elements of the Guard need equip-
  ment compatible with the equipment
  of the U.S. Army units and Air
  National Guard units must be equipped
  with aircraft which possess the
  systems and fighting capa-
  bilities which characterize their active
  U.SAF counterparts.

• Mobilization is a capability which we must
  possess if we are to continue to
  project an image as a leading world
  power. It is an area in which, as has
  been learned in two successive
  MIOX tests, the U.S. armed forces
  are woefully deficient. It is a gross mis-
  calculation to see this as a “Guard and

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