Going Down a Double-Track Road

For more than two years now, the greater part of our time and attention has been directed toward holding the line on strength. It is a whole new ball game and we are close to being consumed by it. The Adjutant General and Commanders at every level were called upon to crank-up recruiting apparatus that had been inoperative for years. While the problem has not been as severe in the Air Guard as in the Army Guard, the bluesuiters have given the matter their share of attention.

Guard leaders and Guardsmen in the States set about the task with determination. In some areas, the mood of the young people whom they sought to enlist was not encouraging. There was a lot of talk in Washington about how badly the recruiter in the field needed help in the form of incentives, but few incentives were forthcoming. Except for some increased funding for advertising and recruiter support, the States were left pretty much on their own.

There were occasional comments from Pentagon officials suggesting that the folks in the field weren’t making a maximum effort.

In the past three months, while the Army was experiencing recruiting difficulties and failing to meet its quotas and the strengths of some other Reserve Components continued to decline, the ARNG had something of a turnaround in its strength situation. In June, July and August, the ARNG showed net gains—not substantial, but in the light of the experience of other Components, significant. It is significant, too, that the Army Guard gained more than 9,000 in strength between June, 1972, and last August.

Those who are responsible for what has been accomplished to date deserve a “Well Done.” We hope that this is just a beginning; that the efforts will continue and the results will be even more significant. Our goal is full recovery of strength.

There are few single-track railroads left in the Country today but hardly any single-track programs. In the Guard we are aware of this and mindful that we must not permit neglect of one segment of the whole program in the pursuit of another. We must guard against undue emphasis on recruiting encroaching on the training mission. With somewhat limited resources, we must move ahead on both tracks.

A fully-trained, but poorly-trained, unit is a limited defense asset. Similarly, a well-trained, but substantially under-manned, unit is of little value in this era when National security demands high levels of readiness in all elements of the Total Force.

Our goal is simply stated: strength and readiness. The two are inseparable in the kind of force the National Guard is expected to and will produce.